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ABSTRACT
This study examines the use of sensemaking and power/influence in the governance 
process of an emerging corporation. It emphasizes the use of the interpretive paradigm 
in examining the ways in which reaUty is socially constructed by a board of directors. 
This text explores the definition of governance at the emerging corporation from the 
inside. It examines the effects of board decisions on the corporation by focusing on a 
specific emerging corporation—here fictiously identified as "Softalk Corporation"— in a 
major American city. Through this case the author examines how situations were 
officially defined, and, how these official definitions translated into real operating 
arrangements over twelve months.
The ethnogr^hic study makes the following assumptions ( I ) Symbols are not 
only expressive medium, but also a medium for substantive action; (2) Symbols are a 
medium for both sensemaking and power/influence; (3) Symbolic processes associated 
with the instigation of change involve evolutionary shifts in directionality; (4)
Symbolic processes simultaneously occur at multiple levels of understanding; and (5) 
Symbolic non-action can be important to change initiation.
ui
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODÜCnON
Corporations are peculiar social creations. They are legal constructs through which raw 
materials, capital, labor, and innovation can be brought together to design, manufacture 
and distribute goods and services. Their existence is not limited in time or space, and 
as independent legal entities, th ^  are distinct from any of the individuals who 
participate in them. They can own property and employ individuals. They can confer a 
great power on the individuals who control them.
Corporations are organized and run by an entrepreneur or a management team 
that raises funds to acquire physical coital and to finance initial operations by 
borrowing from banks or other lenders (debt) or by issuing and selling "equity" shares. 
In exchange for the equity funds, the corporation gives investors securities ("stock") 
that are claims on a proportionate share of the net proceeds of any activity undertaken 
by the corporation, after all obhgations to labor, management, vendors, and other 
creditors have been paid.
Since Adam Smith published The Wealth o f Nations in 1776, political 
economists have argued that the workings of a free market would keep business 
corporations and the individuals that control them from abusing their power and would 
promote the most efficient use of the resources they control. If businesses operated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2inefficiently or produced shoddy products they would soon be out of business. Market 
pressure was to be the fundamental mechanism in a free market society preventing 
corporations from abusing their power. Whether this mechanism works well in any 
given case or at all has been the central question in pubUc policy debates about the 
regulation of corporations over the last century. Are market pressures strong enough 
to prevent corporations from oppressing workers? Can market pressures compel 
organizations to be environmentally safe? Can market pressures prevent corporations 
from issuing fraudulent securities?
When business people assert that a free market economy will lead to the 
efficient use of society's resources for total wealth creation, they are making two large 
sets of assumptions. The first is that the sort of questions just mentioned can be 
satisfactorily solved. These are what those in the field of economics refer to as 
"extemahties" and "transactions costs" (Daft 1992).
A second set of assumptions, and one which is not well studied or understood, 
involves the internal functioning of the organizations through which this economic 
activity is conducted. This text is about one aspect of this second set of assumptions. 
Market pressures are less immediately relevant to the internal functioning of 
organizations, because the central issues here have to do with the interactions that take 
place within the firm itself. These issues include who among the various participants 
in the corporate enterprise model controls what, who makes what decisions, and who 
has what responsibilities to whom in the enterprise. Corporate governance is about 
setting up rules for these things in business corporations (Williamson 1985).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3The expression "corporate governance" is most often ^plied to questions about 
the structure and functioning of boards of directors or the rights and prerogatives of 
shareholders in boardroom decisionmaking. Corporate governance is a fascinating 
sociological subject, for it has to do with power and accountabihty—who exercises 
power, on bdialf of whom, and how the exercise of power is manifested. It involves 
complex webs of personal as well as institutional relationships. It provides the 
"interested observer" with insights into human frailties and strengths at the same time 
as it confronts the student of organizational theory with conundrums. Governing 
mechanisms are, after all, the steering devices for complex organizations—with the 
potential to guide them down the right or wrong paths (Williamson 1985).
Much has been written in the daily press concerning the governance of major 
pubUcally traded corporations, in part as a result of increased shareholder activism and 
in part due to the sizable employee layoffs resulting from "downsizing" and/or 
"rightsizing" of many large U. S. corporations, such as AT&T. In particular, unions, 
community leaders, and certain institutional shareholders have demanded that boards 
pay more attention to their concerns, open themselves ip  to ideas from the outside, 
and even change their structures and habitual forms of operating (see Daft 1992).
Quietly, curiosity about how corporate governance operates in smaller or 
privately and closely held corporations has also begun to grow. "Curiosity" is the right 
word in that governance is seen by many as a kind of black box that it is hard for 
outsiders to penetrate. Moreover, even many of those most intimately involved with 
small and emerging corporations have only a dim sense of where power resides, how it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
is distributed and exercised, and how it is limited and controlled.
When adopted as a plan for the organization of wealth, legal instruments, such 
as corporations, also serve as models of social organization that come to have 
important consequences for processes within the social units to which they ^p ly . 
However, the effect of laws tends to be subtle and cumulative, since legal matters 
within a small corporation, governed by the formal authority of the state remain 
ideologically the antithesis of values founded on person-to-person, face-to-face 
interaction. Thus, when they arise within a small organization, legal issues as such 
initially appear marginal, overly technical, and inconsequential—maneuvering within as 
its shield or medium of adjustment in relation to the political and economical 
environment.
Yet, because they define relationships and specify rights and obhgations more 
authoritatively than do other sources of authority within the enterprise, legal 
arrangements are important in shying both the tone and substance of extended 
shareholder relationships. Legal models of social organization crefuUy insert 
themselves, as limited plans, into the affairs of the board members, and gradually, as 
the company ages, come to structure its interpersonal relations by defining individual 
relations to shared wealth.
Further, in their respective theories of modem industrial societies, Marx, 
Schumpeter, and Veblen emphasized that wealth in the form of business coital is 
fundamentally a metaphysical, abstract phenomenon, which it would be simplistic to 
conceive of in materialist terms. Capital is shorthand for complex social processes and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5relationships of production in a market economy, just as m on^  is deceptively tangible 
as a concq)t, standing for a system of exchange.
As it matures in a context of the closely held or family corporation, capital in 
surrogate form assumes a more resonant sociological and symbolic, rather than 
economic, importance, thus highlighting through its legal constitution the multiple 
abstract dimensions of possessing considerable wealth in Western industrial societies.
This insight is particularly relevant to an understanding of organized ownership 
of wealth, in which the owners never really "see" or touch their collective wealth as a 
totality in the form of coital, property, or money. Rather, they only experience it 
through a calculus of relative interests estabUshed by a set of legally organized and 
sanctioned relationships. The precise form and quantity of any part of the abstract 
wealth are only determinable within the framework of specific transactions among 
owners, itself governed by legal rules.
To effectively compete, or even survive, in market environments that have 
become complex after periods of relative stability frequently requires organizations to 
undertake the process of dramatic, and often traumatic strategic change. Increasingly, 
this type of change is seen not just as a shift in norms, structures, processes, and goals, 
but also as a form of "second-order change" involving a fundamental alteration in the 
social construction of reality (Berger and Luckman 1967). This view suggests that 
strategic change involves, at its essence, a cognitive reorientation of the organization 
(Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991): one that reflects an acceptance of perceptual, structural, 
and contextual discontinuities that occurs through the shifting interplay of emergent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6processes.
From this cognitive perspective, the success of strategic change efforts dqiends 
not only on the organization's ability to undergo a significant shift in direction, vision, 
and values, but also the ability of stakdiolders to understand and accq)t a new 
concq>tualization of the organization. The impetus for this kind of change often hes 
with both a company's board of directors and its top management who are the key 
actors in articulating the need for, and intended nature of the impending change. It is 
in this attempt to forge an understanding and acceptance of an alternative strategic 
reality among corporate stakeholders that influence (Pfeffer 1981), sensemaking (Gioia 
and Chittipeddi 1991), and symbohsm (Pfeffer 1981) are likely to be critically 
important.
Although the role of dramatic change in affecting organizational outcomes has 
been well-documented, the processes involved in promoting cognitive understanding, 
acceptance, and institutionaUzation of a new organizational reahty during strategic 
transitions have not been well studied. The purpose of this study was to examine the 
dynamics involved in constructing new understandings in the embryonic stages of a 
strategic change effort. I tracked, from inception, the proceedings of the reconstituted 
board of directors of the Softalk Corporation, which was instrumental to the change 
process at Softalk, and studied the means by which the members of the board came to 
understand not only their roles, but also the constraining and facilitating factors that 
affected their ability to instigate change. I used a grounded approach (Glaser and 
Stauss 1967) to discover dimensions and nuances involved in the governance and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7change processes. The general research question guiding this study was framed as 
follows; In a corporation where strategies and structures have been established, what 
board processes characterize the development and acceptance of new realities 
associated with the launching of radical change?
While wishing to c^ture the flavor of the corporate board of directors' 
environment, I have equally salient theoretical aims. I wish to present an 
organizational sociology that is grounded in interactionist and cultural concerns, but 
does justice to the reahty of the organization and the equal, insistent reahty of the 
environment outside the organization. Through my ethnogr^hy I present a 
perspective that accounts for the features of the organizational hterature while 
remaining true to the hved experiences of the Softalk board members.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER2 
HISTORICAL & THEORETICAL CONTEXT
The view that the cornerstone of the modem economy is the large firm dates back to 
the onset the industrial revolution. This perspective has been the case especially in the 
manufacturing sector where giant firms dominated throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century. However, the "twin oil shocks" of the 1970s and 1980s have 
triggered an unexpected reappraisal of the role and importance of small and emerging 
manufacturing firms.
One of the main reasons that small and emerging enterprises have been 
"understudied" is that for the better part of this century, it was a widely held behef 
that small firms did not play an important part in the economy, and their role was 
expected to diminish in the future. In country after country, official policies favored 
large units of production and mechanisms of ownership. These goals were pursued in 
free market and planned economies alike, in both developed and developing countries.
The origins of the general model of today's American business corporations can 
be traced to the end of the Civil War. Contemporary formations evolved in the later 
nineteenth century from the replacement of the eastern and southern gentry of colonial
8
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9origins by a new entrepreneurial elite who engineered the growth and integration of a 
national economy. The southem gentry declined r^idly  as a result of the Civil War, 
while the remnants of the eastern gentry lost their predominance in commerce but 
retained their patron roles in certain cities. Both looked on as New York bankers and 
industrialists took control of the national economy, defining a new upper-class culture 
devoted to the accumulation and display of wealth, and promoting the spread of this 
culture across the country (Persons 1973). Entrepreneurs in regional cities emulated 
both high society styles and business methods of these newly rich.
Structural economic changes of the twentieth century, such as the complex 
governmental regulation of corporate ownership and operations, and competition 
within an environment of ever larger concentrations of capital, displaced individual 
entrepreneurs and family firms from dynamic roles in the economy and challenged the 
long-term viabüity of any fixed configuration of family-dominated economic interests. 
A simultaneous ideological reaction against the holding of hereditary wealth resulted in 
increased taxation of the private accumulation and inheritance of wealth and greater 
limitations on the legal vehicles commonly used to preserve such wealth.
A deep underlying adherence to the principle that there were significant 
economies to be reaped from large scale production was embedded in the classical 
socialist model as well. Large units of production were viewed as the most efficient 
means of transforming inputs into outputs, and any deviation from large scale 
production was seen as a socially wasteful use of resources (Gilder 1980). This belief 
in the inherent potential of scale economies, dating back to Karl Marx at least, was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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coupled with the view that it promoted the corporate form of organization which Marx 
expected to lead to a constantly diminishing number of magnates of coital, who 
would usurp and monopohze all advantages of transformation (Avineri 1968). Lenin 
was likewise obsessed with the efficiencies to be gained by large scale production 
units. His expectations about the benefits of concmtration were further enriched and 
developed for socialism by Stalin who implemented (disastrously) the economic 
aspects of his view.
This was the world of countervailing power in whidi virtually every major 
institution in society acted to reinforce the stabihty needed to promote mass production 
in giant corporations. In fact, the unprecedented growth experienced in the West 
during this period has been attributed less to technology than to prevailing social and 
political forces working to provide the market stability required for successful mass 
production. Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s in the West, the emphasis on large units 
of production and scale economies did not seem to be at odds with the contemporary 
economic doctrines about production. In both East and West, mass production was 
seen as the technologically dynamic form of production.
The 1950s and 1960s were the zaiith of mass production in the United States. 
Post-war model of economic development was dominated by large corporation using 
mass-production technologies in an environment of stable prices. At the turn of the 
caitury the large corporation, through vertical and horizontal integration, had been able 
to fix input and output prices; in the 1930s collective bargaining ensured wages were 
fixed, balancing production and consumption; a decade later pubhc policy stabilized
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the level of aggregate demand, the price level, interest rates, and the exchange rate. 
Stable markets were necessary to accommodate production rates characteristic of big 
firms. The specialized machinery needed to produce these quantities was expensive 
and had to be amortized over a long period of time. This "fixed-price" environment 
made the existence of mass production possible in an otherwise unstable world.
By the early 1970s "cracks" had begun to appear in the structure of the 
manufacturing sector in some developed countries, including in some of the world's 
largest firms and industries. At the same time, casual evidence began to suggest that 
small firms in several countries were out-performing their larger counterparts. Perhaps 
the best example was in the United States steel industry, where new firms in the form 
of mini-mills and small firms expanded employment, while the incumbent large firms 
shut down plants and reduced employment. This development following the twin oil 
shocks triggered an unexpected re^praisal of the role and importance of small and 
emerging manufacturing firms, resulting in a divergence of opinion on the importance 
of firm size.
The endogenous instability of the mass-production model based on so many 
production and social rigidities over the past century has given rise to what the authors 
call an "industrial divide." Certain historians contend that the distinction between the 
1930s and 1970s was that, in the latter, there was great confusion over how to 
organize technologies, markets and hierarchies (Hall 1991). In fact, if the Great 
Depression represented a macroeconomic crises, the economic problems of the 1970s- 
1990s were essentially microeconomic and sociological in that the focus was on the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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choice of technologies, organization of firms and industries, markets, and governance 
models.
Equally important, since the origin of corporations as major engines of 
economic activity, two great transformations have occurred in the typical distribution 
of equity ownership of large companies in the United States. From the middle of the 
nineteenth century through the 1930s, promoters and industrialists moved away from 
dependence on wealthy individuals, bankers, and financial institutions for their siq)ply 
of czgiital. Securities markets developed initially to siq)port trading in railroads and 
canals, and efforts to finance the Civil War then greatly expanded trading in debt 
securities (Persons 1973). After the war, utilities and ultimately corporations engaged 
in other forms of heavy industry began movement of share prices, which then provided 
a mechanism by which shareholders could collectively signal management about how 
h ^py  or unh^py they were with the way management was running the company.
The transition of a company from closely held to widely held and actively traded gave 
shareholders the benefits of liquidity for their investments and some information about 
what other investors think about how much a company was worth.
But the need for each individual shareholder to know or understand the details 
of a company's business became much less pressing, and made it is much harder for 
shareholders to have any direct influence over the company if they did not like the 
way the company is being run. This separation of share ownership from control, with 
all its ramifications, has become a much debated issue for corporate governance.
Emerging corporations, unlike large corporations, most often have limited
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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access to traditional securities markets. This limited access is due to the minimal 
revenue streams and asset bases of such corporations. Additionally, these firms 
usually have limited access to traditional debt instruments due to the inherently risky 
nature of their enterprise. Therefore most emerging enterprises obtain debt and equity 
financing in the form of venture capital or high risk debt instruments through the 
private placement of stock. The private placement of stock (stock not sold on or 
regulated by the securities exchange) has additional risks for the investors. In the case 
of successful emerging corporations, this privately held stock is then traded for 
pubUcally traded securities during the initial pubUc offering (IPO) of the corporation's 
stock generally with a substantive incentive going to the owner of the private stock.
In general, separating equity holders from management through the financial 
markets (whether private or pubUc) raises four types of governance problems:
* For firms to operate efficiently, management must have enough leeway to take 
risks, make strategic decisions, and take advantage of investment opportunities 
as t h ^  arise. Management cannot submit every decision to a shareholder vote, 
and, even if it could, shareholders who are not close to the operations of the 
company probably would not be able to make informed decisions.
Nonetheless, management must be prevented from abusing its power and 
position by spending resources or undertaking investments that benefit 
management at the expense of the shareholders. Hence, shareholders need 
mechanisms for effectively monitoring and restraining management.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A small, close-knit groiq) of shareholders with a large total share of equity 
might be quite ^ec tive  at monitoring management, but, if thty are given 
enhanced control rights, then their power also must be restrained to prevent 
them from taking unfair advantage of other shardiolders.
A major commitment of time and resources is necessary for investors (or 
anyone else) to act as effective monitors. But many investors prefer the 
advantages of liquidity and diversity in their portfbhos—advantages that 
may not be consistent with the time and resource commitments involved in 
monitoring.
Investors need rehable and accurate information, developed using consistent 
measuring and accounting procedures. But any measure of performance can 
provide misleading information or distorted incentives by encouraging 
management to focus attention on in^propriate or partial goals. Moreover, 
releasing certain kinds of information to the public can sometimes weaken a 
company's competitive position.
For years governance in the emerging firm sector remained a "riddle wrapped 
in a mystery inside an enigma" to borrow Winston Churchill's celebrated comment 
about Russia. Since these corporations operate under the veil of the closely-held or 
privately held corporate structure their governance and management styles and
*
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traditions go unnoticed by the public and academia alike. Yet, it appears that the 
success or failure of these corporations have a significant impact on the lives of many 
in our society, as small and emerging corporations accounted for nearly 39% of 
American wages in 1991 (Daft, 1992). Only by a lifting of the corporate veil will we 
be able to understand what makes these enterprises work. I believe that the best place 
to start is with the top-rung—the corporate board of directors.
The Board o f Directors
Sitting on top of management of any company, working within a framework of laws, 
regulations, and judicial decisions, is a board of directors. The way board members 
play their roles—accepting and delegating responsibility, accountability, and authority 
for the organization's success—influences the way the organization is led and controlled 
at the very highest level. Board members are often called on to serve as arbiters when 
goals of the owners of the business (shareholders) and those who control it 
(management) come into conflict.
The primary responsibiUty of the board members to shareholders involves the 
creation of wealth. They are responsible for seeing to it that the actions of 
management increase the value of the stock. At the same time that board members are 
pushing for short-term results, however, they are also responsibility for the long term 
survival of the company, which may at times call for actions that will, in fact, 
adversely affect short-term profitability.
Although the board needs to play a larger and somewhat different role in a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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start-up or new corporation, it is important that it not cross the line to management. It 
is not, for example, up to the board to reformulate the strategy of the enterprise but 
rather to expand the thinking, and ultimately the vision, of management, thus ensuring 
that management has the information necessary to drive strategy in the right direction. 
The board's aim is to focus management's concerns on what the organization should 
do, rather than what it knows to do. The board should provide senior management 
with a multifaceted understanding of the world beyond the immediate present 
competitive environment (see Williamson 1985).
Although most organizations begin as personal endeavors by single individuals 
or small groups, as thty grow in size, a major change takes place, as described in 
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner Means's landmark 1932 study of the corporation The 
Modem Corporation and Private Property:
The typical business unit of the 19th century was owned by individuals or 
small grotqis; was managed by them or their appointees; and was, in the main 
limited in size by the personal wealth of the individuals in control. These 
units have been supplanted in ever greater measure by great aggregations in 
which tens and even hundreds of thousands of workers and property worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars, belonging to tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of individuals, are combined through the corporate mechanism into 
single producing organization under unified control and management (1932:46).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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When the change from individual control takes place, management becomes the 
responsibihty of overseers—a board of directors and the senior management of the 
aitetprise. In theory and law, the board's job is to protect the shareholders' property 
and oversee management. The contradiction here is that while "the cornerstone of US 
corporate democracy is the shardiolders' right to elect the board,... (Berle and Means 
1932:6) this role usually amounts to ratifying the board's nominations (which the chief 
executive officer will have played an important part in formulating).
The controls on management stem from Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations that impose administrative rules on corporations designed to assure fair and 
timely elections for directors, as well as to make sure that the corporations disclosed 
all pertinent information to dissident shareholders, and from certain standards of 
conduct arising from legal precedent. In addition, there are external forces that 
impact, to varying degrees, corporate governance. For example, the union 
representing automobile workers is affected by the costs of its members' health 
insurance: Not only must the union's officers bargain over the benefit levels with their 
members' employees to ensure the satisfaction of their members with union 
management, they must pay the benefits when union members are periodically laid off. 
Alliance parmers and major sipphers whose futures are affected directly by the 
success of an organization also are increasingly concerned about governance decisions 
and thus seek representation on boards.
A company in this sense is like a puppet, and the board, its puppeteer. The 
puppet will respond only as a result of appropriate action being taken by the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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^propriate organ of control; either the shardiolders in a general meeting, or the 
directors within their delegated powers and authority.
If the board purports, without the authority of the appropriate organ of control, 
to act in a way that is b^ond  the company's corporate powers, then that act may be 
totally invaUd (known as "ultra vires the company").
The board of directors will typically have vested in it wide powers of 
management, with rights of delegation. It must act within the constraints laid down by 
legislation, by the company's own Articles of Incorporation, and by other contractual 
agreements, most notably those made by lenders, other financiers, loan stock trustees, 
and/or shardiolders (e.g., under joint venture agreements or shareholders agreements).
If the directors purport to authorize the company to act beyond the powers 
vested in the board (known as "ultra vires the directors"), then the directors can be 
held personally Uable. However, a third party will still be able to hold the company to 
its bargain unless the third party knew the act was ultra vires the directors.
In its custodianship of the affairs of the company, the board is primarily 
answerable to shardiolders. There is also an annual requirement for directors to report 
to shardiolders as to their custodianship at the annual general meeting where the 
annual accounts, together with the directors' and independent auditors' reports thereon, 
are presented.
Each director is also required to exercise his/her powers and functions with 
proper care and ^propriate skill and diligence, so as not to cause the company loss by 
his/her failure to do so. The scope and extent of these obhgations is somewhat vague.
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since there are no generally recognized standards as to the degree of skill, care or 
dihgence required. The position of a director here contrasts with the standards that 
have been more fully developed by case law for doctors, accountants, lawyers and 
other professionals.
According to Georg Simmel in his The Philosophy o f Money (1900: 511), the 
ideal purpose of money, as well as law, is to be a measure of things without being 
measured itself, a purpose that can be reahzed only by endless development." Part of 
this endless development is the board member who, in relation to the shareholder or 
investor, is the concrete human incarnation of this abstract functioning of law and 
money.
Another set of players—though not board members—who have an influence on 
boards, are the "various levels of government [that] tax, subsidize, restrict, and control 
business, in some cases impinging directly on matters as basic as pricing (rate 
regulation, informal interventions into price setting) and the direction of investment 
(zoning, required pollution control devices, limits on acquisitions). Yet another force 
is the citizenry, including pubhc interest advocates and environmentalists, who often 
manage to bring their voices into the boardroom through acquisition of stock—and at 
times through board membership (Williamson 1985).
Corporations, like countries, have governments: Whether a corporation is the 
equivalent of a dictatorship, a democracy, a confederacy, a commonwealth, or an 
empire depends on strategic decisions made by its leaders about the rules and laws that 
control the way the enterprise operates. At one end of the spectrum, corporations have
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hierarchical command-and-control ^proaches similar to those of the monarchies of 
old. At the other extreme, th^r set themselves iç  as loosely knit coalitions of 
independent organizations joined together for financial advantage, an ^proach not 
unlike that of the Holy Roman Empire, in which the ruler did Uttle more than collect a 
percentage of the monies gained through the arrangements.
Problems such as maintaining profitabihty, achieving growth, and dealing with 
continuous change result in constant attempts to reorganize and restructure because 
companies have difficulty anticipating the need for new kinds of governance to suit 
new worlds. Corporate organizations today need multiple governance styles at 
different levels and in different functional areas, divisions, units, and locations. Unless 
leaders understand the need for—and the effects of—this kind of governing "diversity," 
they will not be able to help their organizations achieve the flexibihty and adaptability 
necessary to successfully walk the fine line between order and chaos.
In fact, many of the problems besetting corporate organizations arise from new 
ways of working, such as teamwork or empowerment or alliance parmerships, all of 
which have dramatic effects on strategic and operational governance. Leaders who 
insist on adhering to a familiar style of governance at both these governance levels and 
who make exceptions when they think they have no other choice find that exceptions 
soon become the rule. The result is that, no matter what governance model is 
siçposediy in place, the lines of authority, responsibility, and power soon become 
blurred, creating problems ranging from confusion to total paralysis.
To ensure the right structure for the organization, corporate leaders have to
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modify governance models to encompass the changes they Ûiemselves siq)poit, 
changes often made possible or driven by tedmological developments. Moreover, the 
changes in lines of authority and responsibility—and the delegation of degrees of power 
to different members of the organization—that accompany these governance decisions 
must be crystal clear to all participants at all times.
Gaining an understanding of the governance model in use and the ways in 
which the organizational form forces a multiplicity of models at different levels is 
critical to understanding how the corporate organization wül be able to stay on a path 
that neither leads to chaos nor descaids into order. The board of directors must 
attempt to define the enterprise-level model in its continual interaction with 
management.
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CHAPTERS
METHODOLOGY
I approached this study with two basic assumptions: first that organizational reality is 
socially constructed and second, that attempts to change that reality should be studied 
in a way that t ^ s  into the processes used to fashion understanding by the participants 
themselves, to avoid the imposition of ahen meanings iq)on their actions and 
understandings. Therefore I deemed the interpretative approach to research to be most 
^propriate with the font of my analysis being the negotiated order perspective; that 
^proach to the interactionist understanding of organizations pioneered by Anselm 
Strauss and his colleagues from the University of Chicago (Strauss, Schatzman, 
Ehrlich, Bucher and Sabshin 1991). That is to say, I attempt to represent the 
experiences and interpretations of aU participants and informants, without giving 
precedence to prior theoretical views that might not be appropriate for their context.
In this work I have adopted a pragmatic stance toward interpretive research. To 
be interpretive in this sense does not mean that as a researcher one has to engage in 
deeper and deeper levels of subjective interpretation. Rather, I have tried to represent 
the actors' experiential structure and subjective understanding in terms that are
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adequate at their level of meaning. My research reporting tries to maintain the 
interpretations and experiaices of actors in the foreground. This style of reporting is 
not a matter of granting precedence to the sensemaking experience of the actors, but is 
rather one of resisting temptation to downplay it. In this ethnography, I take seriously 
my responsibihty as a researcher to articulate how informant's views are informative.
In that vein, I give u n co m m on attention to the insider's "commonsense" representations 
of their experioice and interpretive worldview. The voice given to the actors, 
however, is not some fawning attempt to take whatever the actors say at face value 
without looking at the deeper structure of their interpretations and actions: the 
presentation of their view is based on a quahtatively rigorous analysis (Corbin and 
Strauss 1993).
Clearly, however, sole dependence on either an informant or a researcher 
perspective presents an incomplete picture. Informant and researcher views each tend 
to reveal and conceal different aspects of phenomena under study. Although informant 
views can reveal rich means and methods by which members construct reahty (see 
Garfinkel 1967), th ^  usually do not address the deep structure of experience.
Similarly, although the researcher views tend to gloss the richness of lived 
experience, thQf place in bas-relief the dimensions or structure of phenomena. In this 
ethnographic work, I attempt to juxtapose the first-hand account with a grounded 
theoretical analysis aimed at uncovering the underlying dimensions of the dynamics 
involved.
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The Researcher's Role
The author has a fifteen year history of board membership on various boards 
throughout the United States and Europe. The author's membership on the Softalk 
board was made at the behest of the company's bank and was unanimously ratified by 
a vote of the shardiolders. Members were aware of the author's reputation in the 
business community and also were aware that the author was in graduate school. The 
fact that I was studying sociology did seem strange to a majority of the members.
The author was nominated for and selected to be a member of the Softalk 
Corporation's Board of Directors in May of 1995. All board meetings were tape 
recorded by the company's Secretary with the complete knowledge of all members. 
Additionally, abbreviated transcripts were made available to all board members, by the 
Secretary of the company, within two weeks following each meetings. As a legal 
formality, all prior meeting minutes were îçproved and signed by each board member. 
A preliminary motion made by the member representing several minority shareholders 
asked for and received unanimous consent from the board to allow members to 
document and distribute any and all information concerning board activities, except as 
either (1) limited in or by law or by a request from corporate counsel or, that (2) 
anonymity or confidentiality of an utterance or document had been requested by any 
member in writing to the other members of the board.
As is the case with most boards, members prepared individual and 
personalized reviews of each meeting for their individual constituencies. Thus, by 
being a board member, the author acquired a distinctive vantage for studying the
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processes by which an emerging corporation is governed. The role of the author was 
therefore one of participant-observer, denoting the dual nature of my participatory and 
observer status.
The participant-observer role allowed me to get as close as possible to the data, 
so that 1 had direct experimce with the knowledge structures of the participants; it 
provided information,meanings, and perspectives unattainable otherwise.
Data
The author used five primary sources of data: (1) his field notes, in the form of a diary 
and meeting notes; (2) the tapes and transcripts of the Board meetings; (3) notes of 
meetings with various company board members, employees and corporate stakeholders;
(4) all documents relating to or in siqjport of actions proposed for Board review; and
(5) my own weekly self-debriefing tapes consisting of reflections on the proceedings 
of the Board.
The author employed conventional ethnographic analysis techniques in that I 
used my membership in the organization as well as my interviews, notes, and 
documentation to infer the subjective interpretations associated with the Board 
experience. The research also relied heavily on the language used by the participants 
during their interactions to try to infer the meanings and experiential understandings 
(Huff 1983). As part of the due diligence process, multiple interviews (one to two 
hours on average) were conducted monthly by and between the six members of the 
Softalk Board of Directors and the ten members of Softalk senior management over a 
twelve-month period.
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The Analysis Process
Over time, the author estabhshed close relationships with the principal participants 
(including the CEO, the other Directors, President, the Executive Vice President, the 
Director of Engineering and the key members of the sales, finance and engineering 
staff) and acquired a sensitivity to the context and forces that might bear on the 
Board's deliberations, hi my analysis, I used procedures based on the tenets of a 
grounded-theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967), which typically involves 
simultaneous data gathering and analysis. Initial data gathering was guided by the 
central research question: What processes are involved in governance of the emerging 
corporation? More specific questions emerged from the progression of my Softalk 
experience.
The heart of the initial stage of the grounded approach is the method of 
constant comparison (Conrad 1982-, Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss 1987), wherein 
data from the many different sources (e.g., multiple informants) or from different 
points in time are repeatedly compared to discem major categories, dimensions, 
themes, or processes. Data from the transcripts, field notes, interviews, and documents 
were repetitively reviewed, coded, categorized, and studied for content and meaning 
until patterns emerged (Agar 1986, Miles and Huberman 1984, Spradley 1980). In this 
study, a range of first-order informant codes (i.e., terms used by the actors; see Van 
Maanen 1979) were developed by the actor-observer. 1 then assimilated these codes 
into a set of summary analytical codes (i.e., labels induced by the researcher that were 
still meaningful to the informants). Based on these codes the 1 also began the process
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
of inducing more general themes or dimensions in the data. Two tentative dimensions, 
"meaning construction" and "influence and politics," emerged which then served as 
guides for more focused data gathering and analysis (a process termed theoretical 
sampling by Glaser and Strauss 1967).
After the initial stage of analysis was completed, the data were examined for 
possible further aggregation into second-order categories and dimensions. This process 
led to the assimilation and labeling of the code groupings at a more theoretical level as 
a means of discerning general patterns in the data. The main outcome of this stage 
was the emergence and formal labeling of two overarching dimensions of analysis; 
"sensemaking" and "power/influaice." All relevant quotes, exchanges, decisions, and 
actions were noted in the data by coding passages using both aggregated second-order 
categories and these two overarching dimensions. These codings were then used to 
guide further analysis in another iteration of theoretical sampling. For example, a 
focus at this point was on further data that had bearing on either sensemaking or 
power/influence. Guiding questions included; What means are used by members for 
engaging in and communicating about attempts to make sense of their experience?
How is power exercised? How is influence accomphshed? Does this sensemaking 
and power/influence processes change over time?
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CHAPTER4 
THE SETTING
Softalk Corporation
The corporation under study is an emerging five year old high technology enterprise 
with products and patents in telecommunications. The company's real name, address 
as well as the biographical data on the participants have been changed to insure the 
confidentiahty of their data. The company's main office is located in Suburbia, a large 
community in the midwestem United States. It has small regional sales offices in five 
cities throughout the United States.
At the time of this research, the company was on the threshold of a major 
reorganization forced by the company's bank, which held over $5,000,000 of secured 
and unsecured debt. As part of a previous restructuring, the bank had obtained the 
right to restructure the board. More specifically, as a condition of extending the 
current line of credit with the company, the shareholders had agreed to dismiss the 
current board and allow the bank to approve the election of a new board of directors. 
Additionally, the bank was reviewing the downsizing effort undertaken by the new 
CEO and a small team of outside consultants.
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Not only was the firm unprofitable at this time, the more than twenty major 
institutional shardiolders were uncertain as to whether they would continue to fund the 
enterprise. Softalk's future was clearly in question.
Additionally, there was great disagreement among the major shardiolders on 
the strategic direction of the company. Lastly, due to the retrenchment stance of the 
previous CEO (the founder), the board was confronted with a legacy devoid of a long- 
range vision or plans for the firm. Although there had been earher attempts to 
develop a corporate-wide strategic plans, these were all unsuccessful and ineffective.
In the words of the new CEO, they were: "Bullshit ! Nothing but self-serving window 
dressing."
When the new bank-selected CEO arrived at the company he was presented 
with a paradox; Softalk was in the most enviable patent position of any company in 
the telecommunications industry, save AT&T, yet was itself unable to convert these 
processes into a profitable product portfoho. The company was steeped in technology 
and in debt. The youthful and talented engineering department was overtly wary of the 
new foreign leader. Past attempts to restructure the firm had faced entrenched power 
and political structures that had contributed to their failure. The history of failures had 
made long-standing members of the firm's stakeholder community (most notably the 
company's bank which held a significant amount of secured and unsecured company 
debt) skeptical of new efforts to implement the drastic type of change needed for the 
corporation to survive as a stand alone entity. Yet, because many of the institutional 
investors were major customers of the bank, the bank agreed to try to work with the
29
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company.
The avowed goal of the new CEO was"...to make this company profitable and 
take it public within thirty months..." Toward that end he pubUcally called for 
"strategic change"; a new term for members of the company and one that was never 
specifically defined except by examples of intended action (e.g., "We cannot continue 
to develop all products for all people...We need to identify pockets of opportunity and 
strike while the iron is hot ...We need to get everyone involved in saving monQf ") 
Reengineering the company would, in the CEO's opinion, enable the corporation to 
pursue a path to profitabihty. The CEO first broached the subject of reengineering at 
a special meeting of the new Board of Directors called in the summer of 1995. He 
stated that the focus was a necessary first step in changing the philosophy, values, and 
ethic of the company
Since the board as a group had Uttle precedent on which to base its 
deUberations and recommended actions it became impotent in the poUcy decision 
process. Only two of the seven members had experience in the concepts of strategic 
p lanning and execution in small companies; most were lawyers or investment bankers 
with no operations or turnaround experience. Thus, the Board was in a position of 
constructing reality with which it would try to deal ( Weick 1977).
The People
Board members are, by law, ^pointed by a majority vote of the shareholders. In 
addition, at Softalk, board members must also be approved by the company's bank. 
Softalk's bylaws called for seven board members, each serving three year terms.
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Historically, in emerging corporations with limited shareholders (less than 35) major 
shardiolders recommend a slate of directors whom they beheve wiU represent "their " 
interests as well as the company's.
This "slating" process was the case at Softalk, where five major shardiolders 
each nominated one individual to represait their interests. The bank recommended 
two independent, also known as outside directors, who were accepted by a majority 
vote of the shareholders. The author was one of those outside directors. The board 
elected one of its members as a Chairman. All of the board members were well 
educated, Caucasian, male, and over forty years old.
According to the corporate bylaws, attoidance at formal Board meetings 
was restricted to the seven board members and a representative of the company's bank 
without the advance ^proval of a simple majority of the board members. As a 
courtesy to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) this rule was customarily waived to 
allow specific individuals to provide data to the Board members. All of the names in 
this text have been changed to protect the confidentiahty of the participants. These 
individuals generaUy included the Softalk Corporate ControUer-Fred Murphy; the 
company's Director of Engineering-Herb Krawcek; the company's marketing vice 
president-Larry Gam and; a variety of legal experts who presented their findings on 
subjects ranging from patent filings, international trade law, and htigahon.
One of Softalk's corporate formahties was that it had to maintain a board of 
directors of seven members. Four of the seven board seats were predetermined by a 
complex set of negotiations outlined in the company's shareholder agreements. The
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remaining  three seats were reserved for the founder and two additional members who 
"were suitable to a simple majority of the outstanding shares as voted at the annual 
meeting to be held on the second Tuesday in Mardi of each year.” The founder and 
the additional two members were to hold their seats for three year terms. Although, in 
reahty, they were "at will" seats. I was elected in the spring of 1995 to the board at 
the suggestion of the CEO whom I had known through another board in which we 
were both non-executive members. Prior to coming "on board" I had never met any of 
the other members prior to the selection interview process.
The new chief executive of Softalk was Jose Lopez, an aristocratic native 
Venezuelan electrical engineer. Jose had been educated in America at a large 
midwestem state college. For nearly twenty-five years after graduating college, Jose 
chmbed the ladder at AT&T, reaching the position of Regional Vice-President. In 
response to the pending 1980's breakup of AT&T he left and became President of the 
U.S. operations of a large J^anese telecommunications company.
The founder, Murray Rothstein was a board member. Originally, he was the 
majority shareholder of Softalk. However, the many previous rounds of equity 
financing had now made him a minority (less than five percent of the outstanding 
shares) shareholder.
Jim Black was a board member. He had secured the initial equity funding to 
start the company from his wife. He was a venture capitalist and former professor of 
computer science at a small midwestem university.
Tim Daley, a well known tax lawyer in Suburbia, was a board member. Tim
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represented one of his clients' investment in Softalk. That client was one of the largest 
family trusts in the country. He was Ivy League educated and had originally worked 
for Price Waterhouse.
Bob Johnson, was an insurance company lawyer and Softalk board member.
Bob was employed by one of the nation's largest insurance companies. His company 
had invested over a miUion dollars in Softalk. Bob often described himself as a 
"company man" and "corporate bureaucrat."
Len Dickey was a venture capitahst and lawyer. He had invested the funds of 
several of his major chents into Softalk. He also served as Chairman of Softalk. He 
had strongly supported the initial hiring of the new CEO.
Tom Sarris was a lawyer and board member. Tom represented the interests of 
a major international materials company which had acquired an interest in Softalk 
through the acquisition of another firm earher the previous year. Tom always 
characterized his company's position on Softalk's corporate endeavor's as "hands-off." 
He rarely spoke at meetings.
The Place
The majority of Softalk's employees work at the main office (over 250 of the 300 plus 
employees). All of the corporation's major activities such as sales, marketing, legal, 
research & development, accounting, assembly & test, quality assurance, 
administration and field service were located at the facihty on Mason Street. The 
Mason Street facility was shared with three other high technology companies. These 
enterprises were all subsidiaries of Fortune 500 firms. The building was a one story
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glass structure spread over ^proximately 500,000 square feet of rolling meadow (of 
which Softalk rented nearly 90,000 square feet), surrounded by a large asphalt parking 
mall.
The Softalk side of the parking lot is filled with a variety of vehicles. Directly 
in front of the building are seven parking spaces, three empty spaces marked 
"customer" and four spaces with vehicles. A spotless new maroon four door Cadillac 
Seville sits parked in a space marked "Vice President -Sales"; a brilliant red two door 
Dodge Viper with a license plate reading -"SOFTALK"- in the space marked 
"President"; in the space marked " Engineering" is a rather dirty drab bluegreen late 
model Toyota Celica beginning to succumb to the ravages of metallic oxidation, and 
on the end in the space marked "Vice President" is a late model white diesel Volvo 
station wagon. The remainder of the well lighted and well groomed lot is a potpourri 
of foreign and domestic vehicles parked in no discernable order. The majority of the 
cars ^pear to be two door models and of Japanese origin.
The outside of the building is neat and modem. One can see into virtually 
every office from the outside, as the both the exterior and interior walls ^ p ea r to be 
made of glass. The corporate signage is chiseled into a large rectangular oak structure 
on the sidewalk in front of the building.
After entering the building one is immediately confronted by an oversized 
reception area more fitting for a large medical clinic than for an emerging high- 
technology corporation. The fern density is urmecessarily high and is offset only by 
two large computer-like boxes—one marked the Softalk 9600 and the other marked
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Softalk 1600. Bdiind and to the right of the reception area are a set of double doors, 
made of thick walnut, that reach ftom the ceiling to the floor and are at least eight feet 
across. To the side of this expanse, at about eye level are two shinny gold plates. One 
reads "BOARDROOM", the other "MEETING IN PROGRESS".
Upon entering the Boardroom, one is immediately struck by the expansive use 
of walnut. The forty foot table is solid walnut, the walls are wainscoted in walnut.
The podium is walnut. The twenty high backed black leather chairs have walnut 
bases. Even the individual place settings are equipped with walnut covered items to 
include nameplates and pen and pencil sets. In the center of the table are several 
electronic devices. A special high technology speaker phone and a voice activated 
t ^ e  recorder. Unlike the remainder of the complex there is a conspicuous absence of 
windows and natural light. A fragrance of power permeates the room.
My space, like that of each member, was clearly delineated. In addition to my 
place setting, there were extra pencils and pens, yellow legal-style writing pads, two 
large bottles of water, one carbonated, one not, and a six inch stack of p^ers, the top 
one marked "Board of Directors Meeting Agenda-Confidential".
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CHAPTERS 
BOARDROOM PROCESSES AT SOFTALK
The Board Meeting
Traditionally, boards conduct their official business at formal board meetings. 
Meetings are an important sense-making form for organizations because they define, 
present, and also reproduce social entities and relationships. In this way, individuals 
may both use and be used by this form. As a sense-making form, meetings are 
significant because they are the organization or com m u n ity  writ small. There may be 
other competing symbols for an organization, such as individual leaders, a building or 
territory, an organizational chart or logo. However, a meeting is a powerful and 
ongoing social symbol because it assembles a variety of individuals and groups 
together and labels the assembly as community action.
Meeting and meeting talk as objectified in minutes, reports, and the like may 
also become the major evidence of organizational action. Political language and 
rhetorical studies that consider language as action (Fine 1984) and that argue that 
"saying is doing" also support this view for a variety of societies.
The idea that meeting talk may be synonymous with organizational action
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requires questioning the standard view that meetings exist as a facilitating form for 
making decisions, formulating policy, solving problems, or resolving a crises. It is 
possible to suggest that decisions, policies, problem solving, and so forth are not what 
meetings are about. Instead, we need to reverse this view and examine the possibility 
that meetings are what decisions, policies, problems, and crises are about. From this 
vantage point, meetings help produce organization, although it is much more common 
to assume the opposite. This ^proach sets meetings at the center of our understanding 
of organizational systems.
At the same time that meetings may be a major form of organizational identity, 
once a meeting has been constructed, the event becomes a vehicle for the reading as 
well as validation of social relations within a cultural system. Meetings are a 
successful social validating mechanism because acceptance of form requires, at least in 
part, acceptance of the current social and cultural order (Dimaggio 1991). A formal 
meeting requires the negotiation and ultimately the acceptance of a set of social 
relationships that define someone's right to call and arrange a meeting, to specify time 
and location, to start and end a meeting, a series of rules and conventions for ordering 
and regulating talk, and recogrtition of this as talk that may be legitimated by the 
meeting.
Much of human understanding occurs through the use of symbolic processes 
(Axley 1984). A symbol can be any sign that represents a concept; thus, the 
representation of the concept becomes the symbol's "meaning" (Geertz 1973). The 
most pervasive medium of symbolism is language. In particular, the use of metaphor.
37
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wherein one concept is understood in terms of another concept already known (Ortony 
1975), is k ^  to understanding (Daft 1983). Indeed, conceptual systems are 
fundamentally met^horical in nature. When we try to understand a new experience or 
concept, we do so by trying to ascribe meaning to it, and meaning is often most 
effectively grasped through symbolic met^horical rqiresentations. Thus, symbols and 
especially language symbols (such as visionary images and metaphors) are basic to the 
process of sensemaking.
When people are called içon to enact some change in their existing patterns of 
thinking and acting, the proposed change must make sense in a way that relates to 
previous understanding and experience (Louis 1980). Symbols and met^hors are key 
to this process (Huff 1983), in part because their inherent ambiguity provides a bridge 
between the familiar and the strange, thus fostering a sense of continuity while 
simultaneously facilitating change. In this sense symbols both conceal and reveal facts 
of change. They conceal threatening aspects within the camouflage of the known, yet 
reveal those aspects that emphasize the difference but, differences are rendered in 
terms that echo the familiar (M ^er 1984). When a major change is proposed, 
different symbolic language is used to herald the change and to articulate its nature.
Our focus, therefore, often is on the language used by organizational actors during a 
leadership crisis.
Sensemaking, however, involves not only "pure" cognitive interpretation 
processes, but interpretation in conjunction with action. In organizations, people take 
into consideration the realized or likely outcomes of their own actions or those of
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other significant stakeholders in trying to understand what to do next. Not only is 
language symbolic, but action itself is symbolic (Feldman and March 1981), 
especially in organizations. In particular, symbolic action is central to the institutional 
legitimacy of the proposed changes, peifa^s as a way of making proposed new 
arrangements subjectively plausible (Berger, Berger and Kellner 1973).
Symbolic actions are frequently used by executives to legitimate decisions and 
strategies that affect perceptions of the organization by members and other 
stakeholders. In attempting to change leaders in an entrepreneurial corporate 
environment, it is arguably necessary to first formulate a strategy to facilitate 
acceptance of the "need for change." Such a strategy depends on symbolic procedures 
to legitimize the transition process. Gaining insight into the symbolic meaning 
structures of organizations and especially into the origins and manipulations of these 
meaning structures allows an understanding of the creation and maintenance of 
alternative organizational realities. (Strauss et al. 1991)
Symbols, met^hors, and actions, however, are not the only means for making 
sense of organizational experience. Both sensemaking and action-taking are affected by 
the context in which they occur. In organizations, context often is defined by 
influence relationships and political structures, an observation that applies to small 
companies as much as large bureaucracies. The construction of organizational reality, 
therefore, is in some significant measure also likely to be influence-based. When 
sense must be made of observed events or proposed changes, people account for 
influence relationships in deciphering or ascribing meaning to a situation. Yet,
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influence in organizations is often more covert than overt; subtlety is its hallmark, 
because powerholders seldom flaunt their influence ability (Frost 1987).
One of the few occasions that influence is likely to be manifested in visible 
ways, however, is during change efforts. Even then, however, influence is likely to be 
subtle, i.e., couched in symbolic representations (Lukes 1974). Thus, influence 
processes are likely to occur in concert with symbolism, which suggests a potentially 
complex interrelationship among symbols, symbolism, influence, and sensemaking.
This perspective also suggests that they can have an instrumental role in 
accomplishing major change in addition to their long-noted expressive role (Edelman 
1964). Symbols, therefore, not only constitute a medium for sensemaking, but for a 
medium for influence as well.
One must also recognize that the symbols, visions, and construction of some 
actors (most notably corporate directors and officers) are more powerful than others, 
and therefore exert greater influence over the meanings attributed to various actions or 
events (Gerth and Mills 1946: 152).
Organizations are political systems. Those in charge must create order among 
people with different interests and agendas. Politics represents one of the processes 
that determine who gets what, when, and how in a legitimate manner. Power, in turn, 
is the ability of individuals or groups to exercise control over these processes (Morgan 
1986; Pfeffer 1981; Kanter 1977).
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An Overview o f the Board's Governance o f Commitments to Unsuccessful Decisions 
Peifa^s the most obvious symptom of organizational troubles at the Board level is 
management commitment to unsuccessful decisions. Staw (1980) has noted that the 
tendency to justify past actions can be a powerful motivation behind organizational 
bdiavior and can often run counter to rationality. As he observes, the justification 
process leads to escalating commitment. When mistaken actions are not being seen as 
mistaken actions, the principle on which they are made is also not seen as mistaken. 
Worse, the feeling that the principle is valid becomes enhanced through the need to 
defend the decision, and thus further decisions are made on the basis of it.
This process is especially lethal in the case of a totalitarian organization, where 
the idea of the perfection of the organization provides the organization's motivational 
base. Here the assumption of the identity of the individual decision-maker and his or 
her organizational role turns the taidency to justify past actions from a defensive 
tendency on the part of individuals to a core organizational process—a central element 
of the organization's culture. Such was the case at Softalk.
It will be useful here to differentiate between totalitarian management and 
idealistic or "transformational" (Bums 1978) leadership. Idealistic leadership involves 
belid^ in the organizational as an organizational ideal, but it relies upon a vision of 
the future that is honestly held and promulgated by the leaders. When the 
organization catches up with the consequences of its actions and finds them 
importantly at variance with its earlier idealistic intentions and projections—when it 
comes to know, in other words, that the decision was a bad decision—it has the choice
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
of either acknowledging its failure, and hence its deviation from the ideal, or of 
denying its failure, and attempting to maintain the image of itself as ideal through 
decq)tion and compulsion. In the former case, it is possible that through imagination 
and creativity a revised ideal can be formulated. Even if it is not, the organization 
will at least have learned something. In the latter case, the organization turns toward 
totalitarianism.
The case of the Softalk 9600 illustrates the process of commitment to 
unsuccessful decisions. Modeled after a competitor's product, the 9600 was powered 
by a proprietary set of circuit cards rather than utilizing the power of the standard 
personal computer platform available through a variety of reputable vendors to such as 
IBM, NEC, and Gateway Corporation. The problems with developing new proprietary 
hardware were well known and documented by Softalk's engineering staff long before 
the 9600 was offered for sale. Understanding the significance of the following 
commentary requires attending to the time it took to reverse the original bad decision.
Member 2 "The questionable technology of the 9600's design has caused a massive 
internal fight among Softalk's engineers...On one side of the argument is 
Rothstein [Softalk's former President] ...On the other side are the top 
engineers...."
Member 4 "The top engineer Herb Krawcek told me that he showed his time and 
cost estimates to Rothstein but by then, he said, "Rothstein's m in d was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
made iç."
Member 6 "In the end, the old board not only went along with Rothstein, it also 
told Krawcek in effect to stop the objections. Get on the team, or you 
can find someplace else to work."
The ill fated 9600 was launched in the fall of 1992. The results were disastrous. It was
only a few months before the customer service department was inundated with 
complaints over the machine's reUability.
When the new CEO Lopez, fully took over the company's reins in the winter of 
1994, he insisted that he be given corporate authorization to fix the problem. Initially 
his request was turned down by the old board as "too expensive." Ultimately, under 
the threat to resign, the old board relented. But it was too late.
(As a postscript, to date, hundreds of thousands of dollars have been spent in 
warranty and legal expenses to remedy the design flaws of the Softalk 9600.)
Explanations of business disasters often assume that the disaster was the result 
of a single, isolated decision that was wrongly made. Indeed, it is typically asserted 
that the decision-making process employed was one that is ordinarily valid but that, in
the specific case, crossed some vague boundary that led to disaster.
Explanations for disasters like these take for granted that the organizational 
context of the decision was basically sound. Set against the presumed backdrop of the 
organization's continuing healthy activity, the decision and the disaster that follow
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from it are seen as an aberration, an unfortunate accident—as much a tragedy for the 
well-meaning and generally competent individuals who made the decision as for its 
more direct victims.
While this scenario is certainly accurate in many instances, there are other 
cases in whidi an opposing vision may be closer to the facts. Here, the specific 
decision is sear as fundamentally flawed and as taking place within a generally 
unsound organizational context. Indeed, from this point of view, the decision is only 
one of the many bad decisions that the unhealthy organization generates naturally and 
almost inexorably.
An Overview o f the Board's Governance in the Strategic Planning Process 
The board met once a month for four to six hours at a time. One of the members 
provided a retrospective synopsis of board life that serves as a foreshadowing 
overview of a narrative from my daily diary that follows:
My initial meeting indicated no agreement as to purpose, required action, or 
vocabulary, leading to the development of a modest sense of desperation over 
the next several meetings. Soon, however, the leadership provided a way out 
of the quandary by invoking the obstensive preferences of a higher authority 
figures (the CEO), who suggested a symbolic framework for initiating strategic 
change. This symbol became the construct for rallying around a unified 
direction that eventually led to substantive action.
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Because the fmdings are woven into the rather complex narrative that follows, 
it is helpful to preview not only the events that transpired, but also the main 
theoretical concepts that subsequently were generated from the study. As noted 
earher, two primary dimensions emerged; sensemaking and power/influence. Both 
dimensions were symbolically based and served as miming themes over the life of the 
study. The board progressed through four phases. During these phases the nature of 
the sensemaking and influence attempts underwent transitions, both in terms of the 
symbols and met^hors used to communicate understanding and action, and in terms 
of the "directionality" of the processes (i.e., whether they were directed inward toward 
the board, or directed outward by the board toward others). Exhibit I presents a 
desriptive summary of these phases including representative quotes.
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Diteipretatioii
Description
"Who are we? and what is are charge? Are key 
questions posited during this stage. Attempts 
are made to interpret experience outside 
models and historical referrents. The board 
becomes aware o f  external influences that 
have the potential to constrain thought and 
action.
Definition
Description 
Top management attempts to define 
strategic change issues for key stakeholders 
by using the board as a conduit. The board 
becomes aware that they are being used by 
top management as a symbol for change.
In response the board begins to define its 
role as facilitator.
Quotes
*  We have a charge Grom the bank which I didn't 
understand then and 1 don't understand now.
*  What are business units? I don't understand your 
strategic either.
* It's not clear who is going to make the real decisions 
or even make recommendations on the strategy.
* I hope they give us some guidance on this stuff.
* Lets look at the planning process of [Softalk] over 
the last two years.
*  We need to account for the CEO's views.
Quotes
*  The CEO just won't take on the 
engineers.
* This is the CEO's plan we re peddling. 
*I f  it goes bad, he'll dump it on us.
* Gam wants to establish OUR criteria.
* Be careful what you say to others.
Legitimation Institutionalization
Description
Top management preferences continue to 
influence the board. To legitimize itself, the 
board begins to align with top management. The 
board also develops its own concepts and terms for 
"giving" sense to top management and stakeholders 
using tactics o f inclusion and cooptation.
Description
Both the board and top management 
attempt to institutionalize change 
and planning processes. The board 
crafts a formal statement to 
influence and create the desired 
meaning for stakeholders.
Quotes
*  We are creating terms that are relatively value- 
firee; then we give them meaning for others to use.
* Hopefully, we can convince the CEO that we are 
serious... and we mean business.
* He is trying to influence us again with HIS plan.
* We have to make this acceptable or be at war with 
the engineers.
Quotes
*  We are going to institutionalionalize it.
* We have the power now.
* This is a radical solution for this place.
* We need to say up-firont that we are 
different fi'om the previous escapades.
* We should get one o f  us as COO. This 
would assure we stay in control.
Exhibit 1
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The hiteipretation Phase
The early meetings of the Softalk Board were distinguished by attempts of the 
members to construct some identity for themselves and some interpretation of their 
charge. These attempts were foundering, triai-and-error efforts to answer the 
fundamental questions: Who or what are we? What are we sxçposed to do? Given 
the lack of historical analogues, such ^parently simple questions turned out to be very 
difficult indeed. Members described their situation as "having no precedents," "being 
at ground zero," and saw several meetings as fraught with "mayhem" and "confusion." 
The following exchange cultures their nascent state and the effort to arrive at some 
interpretation of their task:
Chair: "Our charge is to examine all of the alternatives. We are
conducting strategic planning and survival management at the 
same time." (pause)
Member 1: "I don't understand what that means, (pause) I don't understand
"alternative levels" either."
Member 2: " We are hoping you would explain!"
Member 3: " I just don't understand. What do you want me to do? I need to
know when we expect to be done here."
Clearly "survival management" was intended to be a meaningful, action-oriented 
metaphor in this scenario, but the members did not have a workable definition of it.
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Even after lengthy discussions, the issue repeatedly surfaced:
Chair: "Again 1 think the main thing we need to do is identify the
meaning of "survival management" and "strategic planning."
Member 2: "Are you speaking from our or the bank's perspective?
You mean from the bank's perspective."
Primarily, the early meetings consisted of rqieated attempts at figuring out the 
board's purpose and role, as well as efforts devoted to negotiating the meaning of key 
terms (which occurred on at least eleven sqiarate occasions during the first meeting 
alone). The multiple discussions surrounding the central notion of strategic planning 
were based on such metaphoriced representations as: strategic planning units as 
"constituent parts or atoms," "planning machinery," "centers of excellence"; all of 
which were proposed and discussed, but were never established as defining metaphors.
At these early meetings, the Chairman alluded to senior management's notion 
that emulating another company's planning model might be a possible way to help 
define their own situation. ("He wants us to have a look at the Motorola model; 
thinks it might give us some ideas ") Although that model was dismissed at that point 
(though revisited later), the influence of top management and other stakeholders on the 
board's efforts now was evident. As this initial phase of the board's development 
progressed, members became aware of the effect of the actions and desires of others 
on their own thinking and possible actions, which engendered considerable indignation
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and affective reaction by other members who argued for autonomy in deciding how 
they might frame the change problem and what they could and should do to address it. 
Nonetheless, there were several attempts to infer "what the bank wants," a reference 
to the bank's implied power to define the situation in terms of their stated "ongoing 
concern" status.
The Definition Phase
As the board continued to flounder, a sense of powerlessness and resignation settled 
in. (It seems to me that you're either a surrogate of the CEO or you're nowhere ") In 
addition, the members began to suspect that they were being used as a symbolic 
device in top management's attempts to sway other stakdiolders, especially the bank, 
to "buy into" the strategic change notion. For one thing, the mere existence of the 
prominent and "new" board signified a serious (albeit nebulous) intent to change. The 
members also began to see that the CEO's public statements limited their range of 
possible thinking and acting and made them pawns in some larger game;
Member 2: "He's done it again He's gone around us.....
You know, I am starting to believe that the son-of -a-bitch 
believes we are nothing more than a rubber stamp... "
During this phase of the board's evolution there were several pronounced 
allusions to the strong symbolic implications of not taking certain actions, e.g., of not
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defining a strategic business unit to include certain constituent groiqjs, especially those 
coveted by multiple factions. This tactic prefigured a running theme in deliberations; 
overt attempts to anticipate the meaning of decisions and actions (to themselves and 
others) as a way of avoiding trouble. Avoidance, in the form of considered non­
action, was a proactive tactic. Of particular importance, the members were sensitive 
about signaling any impaiding drastic actions;
Member 6; "I think it would be unwise to stray too far from the current 
structure..."
Member 3; "Let's make sure we consult the right people first....
I am extremely nervous about the engineers' reaction..."
Eventually the board members defined a role for themselves as facilitators and 
governors in managing the change process. Still, th ^  failed to develop a framework 
for envisioning specific processes to be used, and their . of consensus and inaction 
invited external intervention.
The Legitimation Phase
If the earlier board deliberations were aimed at answering the questions "Who are 
we?" and "What should we do?", subsequent events were focused on a related but 
different series of questions; "How can we be perceived as legitimate agents of 
change?" "How can we exert influence (without bringing on conflict and
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countervailing influence)?" "How can we accommodate the CEO in disseminating the 
market leader vision?" By far the greatest direct influence on the board was the CEO 
himself who siqiplied the specific charge for the committee, shaped their framework 
for strategic planning, and (either intentionally or unintentionally) affected board's 
actions via his public declarations. Although the members recognized his influence 
tactics ("He's fucked us again!") and chafed about them ("I think politically we're 
driven to do what he wants"), they ultimately accepted them as legitimate. ("He is, 
after all, the CEO ") Consequently, the board aligned themselves with the CEO as a 
way of obtaining surrogate legitimization for themselves. Ultimately this is the CEO's 
strategic plan. We need to present ourselves as implementors of the CEO's wishes.
In addition to the CEO, other individuals and groups held considerable sway, 
including other top managers (e.g., the head of engineering), and other stakeholders 
(e.g., the bank, which argued that its "traditional role" was being ignored). Concern 
over the reactions of these groups, in particular the bank's, continued to receive 
attention. The members continued to be wary of this presumed nemesis whom they 
assumed would try to sabotage the change process. Therefore, they kept working to 
avoid a confrontation.
Member 6: "[We need to] recognize that these people will feel they're being
undermined or excluded and will try to do something about it."
Member 3: "You can pick your sides, marshal your troops and hope you
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win. But I don't see the sense in making a war out of it."
The symbolic importance of allowing potentially recalcitrant factions to play a role 
became a key issue affecting not only the credibility of the board, but its viability as a 
change agent as well. The tactic adopted was one of inclusion and co-optation;
Member 2; "There have to be senior managers, department heads, other
administrative mid-level people, and employees that have to feel 
a sense of ownership of the plan all up and down the line."
We should also give appropriate input to vendors, customers, and 
even people outside the company who have a strong stake in 
this."
In the latter part of this phase, however, the board began to move toward an 
influencing stance of its own. Although members couched their attempts at influence 
in terms of trying to communicate "what the CEO wants," they also tried to develop 
themselves into a force to be reckoned with.
Member 4; "Let's not ask for advice; if we ask for advice, we'll get it."
Members recognized the paradox that in order to create the context for strategic 
change, which implies radical redirection, they had to avoid the appearance of
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proposing radical change;
Member 4; "Let's not fiick this up, I mean lefs not let those engineers get 
involved and start redirecting it"
A feature judged to be necessary to ally fears and disarm resistance or even 
attempted sabotage of the process. In actuality, th ^  viewed the new corporate design 
as a smokescreen that concealed the real change vehicle from those that might 
undermine the process, the iimocuous "Business Units" that contained the potential for 
triggering substantive change. A one member put it;
Member 2; "This is just a way to finesse the real teeth in the new mission 
and goals thing without suggesting that we have a final planning 
formulation. This way, there won't be any consternation with 
this stuff that will cause people to want to shoot you down."
The role of the business units was described with the rich metaphor, "prisms 
transmitting a spectrum of inputs." Taken collectively, the business units were 
variously, but convergently, described as "beads on a necklace" and "pearls on a 
cheiin" to connote their role as components of the strategic change effort and 
associated planning "system" that would generate strategic change.
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The Institutionalization Phase o f  the New Board
Di the final work of the board during year one, attention turned toward the construction 
of an influential statement that would explain and give rationales for their 
recommendations to outside constitumcies. There was a keen awareness on the part 
of the members that the language of this rqiort was very important to convQf the 
desired meaning to outsiders as well as to top managemoit.
Member 5: "They [the board's recommendations] have meaning in this
context; they do not yet have meaning b^^ond it."
In the attempt to create the desired meaning, multiple instances of 
"wordsmithing" were noted by writers, i.e., labels and language were intentionally 
selected to conv^ the "right message." The final report itself was an overtly symbolic 
document cast in metaphorical and rhetorical terms.
Member 5: "We are trying to identify a dominant chord from amid the
cacophony of individual planning documents."
The report attempted to describe not only the need for restructuring, strategic 
planning and change, but the approach to be taken by the company. It provided 
rationales for adopting the proposed strategic planning process and became the primary 
statement of the direction of the strategic change effort.
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In this final phase of the board's initial year of life their attempts to exert their 
own influence increased as did their attempts to lend permanency to their vision and 
proposed actions; these were mainly efforts by the board to influence their 
constituencies to accept their way of thinking while avoiding conflicts that might 
undermine the delicate process. These discussions were life with met^horical 
description, with a marked preference for war met^hors
Member 3: "I know we have to bite the bullet, but I don't want to
immerse this thing in a huge struggle..."
Once again, the idea of vesting power in the mid-level managers to decide 
their own planning targets was affirmed, thus averting a likely rebellion by the 
engineering department:
Member 1: "This should get it past the techno-geeks, who could scuttle this
whole thing completely..."
As a result, the board began a series of attempts to "co-opt" or "draft" 
stakeholders. These attempts ranged from stressing how the "long-term viability" of 
the company would be enhanced if the board's recommendations were adopted, to the 
adoption of a political strategy that focused on aligning the board with the CEO as a 
means of garnering support. They also attempted to engineer the appointment of one
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of the board members as Chief Operating Officer because he had "sufficient 
understanding and clout to make sure the thing will work out."
As a more overt example of influence, the board culminated their efforts by 
attempting to forge the final document into an instrument of lasting impact. Of critical 
importance to the board was the goal of "internalizing" the change effort through the 
board's recommendations;
Member 3: "What we are trying to institutionalize here is that both missions
and goals are locked in right at the top: in the CEO's office, in 
the board, and in our recommendations."
Member 4: "What we're suggesting to be implemented becomes part of the
general strategic planning process. We'll put it in a plan that the 
CEO can push."
Member 5: "We want to enculturate Softalk toward the concept and
associated structures of strategic planning."
These efforts were deemed to be a necessary step toward a major strategic change. 
Indeed, the CEO declared that strategic plan and reengineering would be the lasting 
legacy of his administration.
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ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION
Discussion
Contained within the first-order narrative are a number of substantive findings about 
the nature and uses of symbolism, sensemaking, and influence processes. But, to tease 
out their deeper structure requires not only reference to the "story," but also analysis 
from a second-order level. Such an analysis does not discount the first-order findings 
(which are adequate at the level of meaning of the informants; see Weber 1946), but 
employs an alternative view to gain insights using a more "theoretical" perspective.
At this level of analysis, I began by treating the first-order findings as data. I first 
attended to the insights generated from the case itself, as well as the ethnographer's 
interpretation of it, focusing in particular on key terms and events (Isabella 1990). I 
then employed the procedures described in the Method section to aggregate the first- 
order codes and categories, assign them second-order thematic labels, and then induce 
the overarching dimensions of sensemaking and power/influence. I begin by 
summarizing the significant events in the narrative.
First, an examination of the narrative progression, as well as the codes and 
categories, reveals a pervasive use of symbols and metaphors in the board's attempts to
57
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make saise of their experience. "Market niche " quickly became the overarching 
visionary symbol and "survival management" soon became the dominant operational 
symbol. "Strategic planning" emerged as an ambiguous, ill-defined, but nonetheless 
guiding m et^hor in this context (i.e., in a smaller enterprise that, unlike most large 
businesses, had not previously employed this specific concept). An array of 
stqpporting metaphors and other ridi language infused every phase and aspect of the 
board's attempts at framing, defining, interpreting, and acting upon issues. In addition 
to the many considerations of symbolic actions involving the board, the symbolic 
implications of not taking some apparently logical actions also played a significant 
role, mainly as a way of avoiding countervailing influence.
Secondly, an examination of the first-order narrative and the attendant 
analytical codes also showed that various forms of influence permeated the experience 
of the board. Indeed, it became evident from these analyses that both the 
understanding of influence and consideration of its use were rooted mainly in symbolic 
expression. For example the influence of the CEO was manifested in an explicit 
fashion via his metaphorical framing of the board's charge and his interjection in the 
governance process; it was manifested implicitly in his preemptive public statements to 
the bank and employees that limited the board's possible actions and co-opted them as 
an influential symbol of change. Other important forms of influence emerged in the 
board's awaraiess of and careful attendance to the existing power structure, expressed 
in terms of a range of evocative conflict metaphors and symbols. The board's own 
attempts to act as influencing agents were accomplished in several ways: by adopting
58
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a surrogate role aligning them with the powers-that-be; by disguising the genuine 
power of the bank to allay the fears of other wary poweiholders; and by using potent 
ihetorical devices as their primary means for influencing stakdiolders to accept their 
recommendations and to institutionalize an orientation toward strategic change.
Taken together, the many symbols and met^hors played a central role not only 
in the board's attempt to make sense of their experience by socially constructing their 
identity and purpose while dealing with external influence attempts (which 
characterized the early phases), but also in their attempts to construct ways to avoid 
resistance, legitimize themselves, and exert lasting influence on the thinking of other 
stakeholders (which characterized the later phases). These observations suggest 
another dimension to the analysis that becomes evident from the second-order level; 
There were subtle, but important, transitions in the directionality of the sensemaking 
and influence attempts over the interpretation, definition, legitimation, and 
institutionalization phases of the board's life cycle. In the early, developmental stages, 
attention was focused on what might be called internal sensemaking; in the latter 
stages attention was focused on what could be called external sensemaking in that they 
were trying to affect the understanding and actions of crucial external actors (a process 
termed sensegiving by Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991).
The major findings of the second-order analysis are shown in Exhibit 2, which 
includes the main dimensions of sensemaking and influence in terms of the guiding 
symbols and met^hors uses, as well as the directionality of these dominant processes.
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Interpretation
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Exhibit 2
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This depiction is grounded in the data in that it represents an integration of the major 
fmdings presented in the preceding narrative, but takes a more theoretical perspective 
on events. It portrays not only the major players in the strategic change initiation 
process (top management, the board, and k^r stakeholders), but also the manner in 
which sensemaking and influence evolved and were directed over the new board's first 
year of existence. To this point I have treated the sensemaking and influence fmdings 
as distinct, although it is evident from both the first-order narrative findings and the 
second-order analysis that they
indeed converge across all stages of the board's first year of life.
Interpretations
Studies concerning deliberate strategic change typically have investigated the impact of 
various demogrqihic and economic factors on different aspects of change. Although 
these studies have established statistically significant relationships among key change- 
related variables (e.g., senior management, structure, and effectiveness), they have not 
provided fundamental descriptions or explanations about how such dramatic changes 
are accomplished (Greiner and Bhambri 1989). The dynamics of the governance 
process and corporate restructuring in the emerging corporation have not been well 
studied. Understanding this initial period in corporate growth is a relatively new and 
problematic concept.
The focus on these aspects of strategic change suggests a notably different view 
of the process itself: Strategic change can be understood not only as a change in the
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position and fît of an organization in its environment, but perhaps more fundamentally 
as a change in the cognitive perspective represented by a new strategy. Strategy as 
cognitive perspective (Ginsberg, 1988, Mintzberg 1987) emphasizes the set of 
assumptions through which the problems and issues of the organization are identified 
and interpreted by top managers and key stakeholders (Hedberg and Jonsson 1978).
The alteration of this "conceptual lens" represents a fundamental shift in the 
organization's belief structure, value system, and identity (Bartunek 1984, Dutton and 
Dukerich 1991, Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991, Walsh 1988). Indeed, reorienting strategic 
systems, structures, and commitments requires efforts to legitimize not only the new 
social order represented by the change (Zucker 1987), but also how the legitimization 
process itself will occur (Scott 1991).
Efforts to stabilize a social system influx from the systemic upheaval 
represented by strategic change can be understood as the symbolic interplay of 
sensemaking and power/ influence. These processes emerged in the attempt to 
develop a consensual redefinition of social reahty on the face of an induced 
discontinuity in the existing perspective of the corporation and its stakeholders. In the 
process of trying to develop a strategy for instigating strategic change (a "meta­
strategy") (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984), the board members had to make sense of their 
situation for themselves and others, while simultaneously acting as both influenced and 
influencing actors. In the midst of the uncertainty, ambiguity, and political tension 
that marked these attempts, key metaphors and symbols emerged that simultaneously 
heralded, represented, and facilitated the change. Indeed, symbols and metaphors
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dominated the experience of the board as it progressed through the interpretation, 
definition, legitimation, and institutionalization phases of its life cycle.
Key symbols and metaphors were central to the construction of meaning and 
the communication of understanding, and also acted as an impetus for influence and 
action. Symbols became the primary means by which participants grounded their 
perceptions and articulated their preferences concerning many aspects of strategic 
change. Specifically, symbolism became the language for understanding change, while 
the interplay of sensemaking and influence captured the specific actions associated 
with attempts to redefine and legitimize the new social reality.
The board was the means for executing what might more accurately be termed 
a reinstitutionalization process surrounding the strategic change effort, 
reinstitutionalization implies an accepted reorientation in the dominant belief structure 
of the organization. In the broader view, this process of attempted reinstitutionalization 
involved both substantive action and expressive representation for its accomplishment. 
Yet, it is clear from the findings that both action and expression took symbolic forms 
at various times. Pfeffer (1981a), Edelman (1964) and others have implied that the 
role of management can be divided into more-or-less separate "substantive" and 
"expressive" functions. Symbolism is usually cast only as a medium of expression, 
thus suggesting that the symbolic aspects of management have little to do with 
instrumental action.
This study has revealed not only the pervasiveness of symbolism in the 
initiation and acceptance of strategic change, but also that symbols are one of the main
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means by which management accomplishes substantive action. Thus, the two 
functions ^p ear more symbiotically related than previous portr^als have cast them. 
The instrumental aspects of management are often symbolically communicated, and 
the symbolic aspects are often instrumental to action.
Symbols central to the case took several forms in addition to those already 
noted. In particular two manifest forms, symbolic action and symbolic non-action, 
played major roles. Actions, such as the specification of strategic business units and 
target market niches, carried significant symbolism, both within the board and to 
external targets of intended influence. Less obvious, but also of importance, was the 
symbolically significant avoidance of certain actions, often to circumvent probable 
countervailing influence by others (Dutton and Dukerich 1991). This concem with 
studied non-action by the board members revealed a phenomenon that had an 
anticipatory character about it: the conscious and intentional consideration of the 
probable future impact of certain actions, and especially non-actions, on the meaning 
construction processes of themselves and others. I have come to label this process as 
"prospective sensemaking," mainly in recognition of its future-oriented focus. 
Prospective sensemaking was a frequent influence on the consensual understandings 
reached and decisions made by the boards. Their repeated attempts to infer the future 
consequences of proposed actions as a way of understanding their present situation 
moved the board members to be both proactive and prospective information seekers 
(Louis 1980).
Symbols were also influential in suggesting changes in structural arrangements
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without implying loss of image or status for those affected by the change, a point 
noted by Trice and Beyer (1984). The effective use of symbols is essential for 
organizations that are susceptible to environmental changes. In the case of the Softalk 
board, its recommendation to designate "strategic business units" was based mainly on 
the need to insure organizational flexibility for change without provoking the 
engineering department by signaling that their traditional power was being diluted.
This finding affirms Pondy's observation that, "In organizing, the use of metaphor 
simultaneously facilitates change and reinforces traditional values" (1983: 164). In my 
terms, symbols facilitate change because they simultaneously reveal and conceal 
important features of change.
The often blurred distinction between sensemaking and power/ influence 
processes found in this study suggests that they were interdependent and reciprocal 
processes during the launching of strategic change. (Indeed, over 40% of the passages 
in the transcripts that were coded as sensemaking coincided with those coded as 
power/ influence). Thus, the usual conceptualization of sensemaking and 
power/influence as separate processes disguises their interrelationship.
Sensemaking and power/influence, however, varied in terms of their source and 
directionality over the life of the study. For example, as the board evolved from the 
early to mature phases, it moved from being the conduit (Axley 1984) for sensemaking 
and power/influence for key stakeholders. Overall, sensemaking and influence efforts 
were directed primarily inward toward the board during the interpretation and 
definition stages and mainly outward from the board during the legitimation and
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mstitutionalizatioa stages. That is, in the early stages the critical issue for the board 
members was how to interpret the alternative diange processes and concepts they 
confronted. Their sensemaking efforts were suscqitible to the influmce of external 
actors (especially the CEO and other top managers who were perceived by board 
members to be engaged in "political" behavior). Over time, they shifted to 
constructing means to influence the soisemaking processes of others (Gioia and 
Chittipeddi 1991, Whetten 1984).
These finding suggest that strategic change efforts instigated by new leadership 
(in this case, a new CEO) might effectively begin with attempts to legitimize a 
structural component of the organization to convey to stakeholders that the message 
and process of change is being institutionalized. Indeed, the new board became a key 
symbol of the change process. The existence, size, composition, and charge of the 
board were symbolic indicators to the banking and investment community of the 
commitment to strategic change (see Feldman and March 1981).
In the case of Softalk, symbolic actions were taken to disguise an intended 
second-order change and make it s^pear as a less threatening first-order change 
(Bartunek 1984). The affirmation of existing structures in the form of strategic 
business units, while simultaneously embodying the potential for radical change, was 
an instantiation of the power of symbolic action both to emphasize the comforting 
features of a change while de-emphasizing the threatening features. This influencing 
feature of symbols converges with Lukes' (1974) view of influence as the ability to 
prevent conflict by affecting perceptions, cognition, and preferences of recalcitrant
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parties. It also constitutes a manifestation of Pfeifer's (1981b) argument that influence 
is concealed in the ability to affect decision premises.
In summation, the major inferences of this study would include the following 
observations: (1) Symbols are not only an expressive medium, as most existing 
portrayals imply, but also a medium for substantive action. (Symbolism, therefore, not 
only c^tures the thoughts and feelings of organization members, but is action- and 
outcome-oriented as well); (2) Symbols are a medium for both sensemaking and 
power/influence and these two processes are inextricably intertwined.; (3)
Symbolic processes associated with the instigation of change involve evolutionary 
shifts in directionality; (4) Symbolic processes simultaneously occur at multiple levels 
of understanding; and finally, (5) Symbolic non-action can be important to change 
initiation. (Not doing something can be as symbolic and substantive a harbinger as 
overt action.)
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